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Abstract
The present paper claims that Spinoza’s thought is crucial for a
radical criticism of the different aspects in the formative apparatus
of the Netherlands in the XVII th century. Spinoza  can be considered
as a ‘master of suspicion’ against those educators who instead of
forming their students de-form them. His alternative paideutic
project is not compatible with the principles of pedagogy understood
as a science. This is because Spinoza’s notion of form is not
identifiable with a universal, but is always inseparable from the
embodied singularity of the mode. Standard readings interpret
Spinoza as an enemy of authoritarian education or as a philosopher
who rejects the sad passions. But these readings are partial as they
do not grasp the broader pedagogical design implicit in Spinoza’s
work. This design puts forth an original conception of the body as a
singularity; it requires continuous work on the mnestic connections
and has evident political implications that are well expressed in the
concept of accommodatio.
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Resumen
El siguiente ensayo sostiene que el pensamiento de Spinoza es
crucial para una crítica radical de los diferentes aspectos de los
aparatos formativos de la Holanda del siglo XVII. Spinoza puede
ser considerado como un ‘maestro de la sospecha’ en contra de
aquellos educadores que de-forman en vez de formar sus estudiantes.
Su propuesta paidéutica alternativa no es compatible con los
principios de la pedagogía entendida como ciencia. Esto se debe a
que la noción de forma que utiliza Spinoza no se puede identificar
con un universal, sino que es siempre inseparable de la singularidad
encarnada del modo. Interpretaciones habituales colocan a Spinoza
como un enemigo de la educación autoritaria o como un filósofo
que rechaza las pasiones tristes. Pero estas lecturas son parciales ya
que no captan el amplio diseño pedagógico implícito en las obras de
Spinoza. Este diseño presenta una concepción original del cuerpo
como singularidad; requiere un trabajo continuo sobre las conexiones
mnemónicas y tiene implicaciones políticas evidentes que están bien
expresadas en el concepto de accomodatio.
Palabras clave: aparatos pedagógicos, técnicas de formación,
Bildung, forma, potencia afectiva, cuerpo individual, la corrección de la
memoria, accomodatio.
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1. Introduction: Philosopher and Pedagogical Apparatus:
A difficult Relationship
Although Michel Foucault has never given a genealogical account of
Western pedagogy,his entire work seems to imply that the pedagogical
systems of modern Western societies is one of the most powerful
apparatuses regulating the discipline of society. At the outset of the
Italian edition of the 1977 collection of interviews and essays entitled
Microphysics of Power, Foucault explains the importance that the
pedagogical apparatus has acquired in modern societies. This began with
a coupure épistémologique that intervened in the Modern age after the
change of power’s demands on individuals. Foucault claims that in feudal
societies power demanded that individuals manifested different signs of
loyalty (e.g. rituals, ceremonies) and contributed with different goods
(e.g. taxation, raids, hunting, war). In the 17th  century, power begins
expressing itself through the demand of productive performances.  Thus,
the “embodiment” of power becomes necessary; the dressage of the
body becomes necessary, and the gestures, the daily habits of conduct
become more and more respondent to the requests of the pre-capitalist
society. It is at this time that school disciplines become more important
and tend to turn children’s bodies into objects of very complex forms of
manipulation and conditioning1.
In particular, schools assume a central function in modern society.
Foucault claims that schools have become politically hypersensitive
areas after they became places where citizens, producers, consumers,
and all subjects are educated and formed; in other words, they are places
of subjectivization. Subjectivization has a twofold meaning in Foucault: it
means the constitution of a subject but, at the same time, the subjugation
of subjects, bodies, and minds to something else (in a word, discipline).
These introductory remarks on Foucault are important to put the
Netherlands of the Golden Age into focus. Spinoza’s brief life took place
1 Foucault 1977, 19.
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there. In that nation special attention towards children and education2
developed, most likely due to the financial development of its commercial
society and to the political context of the newly born Republic. In my
reading, Spinoza is in contrast with the pedagogical apparatus of his time.
In fact, it is possible to find in his thought a criticism of Dutch pedagogical
institutions and a project for a new and revolutionary kind of pedagogy
that is worth considering also today.
Before moving to Spinoza, it is necessary to clarify that the conflict
between the philosopher and pedagogical institutions emerges within
philosophy itself. The epoch-making events of the history of Western
philosophy can be read as an attempt to counterbalance the inadequacies
of the educational systems of their time; we might even say that the
construction of a new philosophy has its deepest motivation in the crisis
of an anthropo- paideutic order, or in the unfulfilled promises of a Bildung.
It is easy to find in a philosophical project the answer to the failure of the
dominant paideia, of the formative expectations of a culture. Plato’s case
is emblematic. Is not Plato’s philosophy the powerful, magnificent answer
to the failure of Pericles’s pedagogical project? The Periclean generation
that had produced the ancient democracy, a moment considered
extraordinary in the history of Athens and in the entire history of the West,
was unable to use Plato’s words, to teach what virtue is. For this reason,
it had failed its paideutic mission. Plato lived in his own flesh the failure of
that pedagogical project; he witnessed the degeneration of the tyranny of
the thirty, the shadows of the democracy that sentenced Socrates to death,
and the unstoppable affirmation of the ‘technicians of formation’, the
sophists.
But we can easily speak of more modern examples: Descartes who
reacts to the Jesuitical education of La Flèche, Nietzsche who argues
against German academic pedagogy and observes the worrisome birth
of mass culture…
2 See Schama 1987.
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It seems to me that the conflict between the philosopher and the
pedagogical apparatus becomes even more evident in Spinoza. Spinoza
faced the failure of two pedagogical enterprises, which had powerful
consequences on his philosophy: first, as a child and a teenager, he attended
the rabbinic school of Amsterdam, of which he was a very promising
student. This experience ended with a painful rupture, as we all know
well. But he was also disappointed by the Bildung offered by the newly
born 17th century free Republic of the Netherlands, which promised liberty
and tolerance. Spinoza praises the Republic in the TTP. In this book, he
declares his pride for being a citizen of the Republic. He witnesses the fall
of the promises of the Republic, the rise of the tyranny of the Orangism,
and the incapacity of the tolerant culture of the Republic to contrast the
degenerations of the growing uncompromising Calvinism. This was the
sign for him of the paideutic failure of the Republic, as exemplified
dramatically by the barbaric Dutch multitudo with the cruel and despicable
mass lynching of what were –according to Spinoza– two just men, the
De Witt brothers.
2.  Spinoza against the Bad Teachers
The vibrant pages of the Preface of a «militant» work such as the
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus3  sound like a vehement charge against
the ‘bad teachers’, in particular the doctors of the Church, «none of them
actuated by desire to instruct the people» (TTP, preface). Let us follow
the opening remarks of Spinoza’s work. The topic discussed is the
superstition about the dangerous and hard events of life, which raise an
uncontrollable fear in intellectually weak human beings. All regimes aiming
3  Riccardo Caporali describes the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus as a «militant» work
in his discussion of Steven Nadler’s A Book Forged in the Hell. Spinoza’s Scandalous
Treatise and the Birth of Secular Age (2011). He objects to Nadler that the political meaning
of  TTP (that is, the desire for a criticism of the monarchic and theocratic degeneration of the
Dutch Republic represented by Orangism, including the official Calvinist church and the
rabbinic community) is not simply one of the many facets of the book, but is instead its
pivotal point. (Caporali 2013, 293-300.)
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at subduing human beings have always concealed under the name of
religion various strategies for making men grow in fear, «so that they will
fight for their servitude as if for salvation» (TTP, preface). That power
behaves in such a way is not surprising to Spinoza. He admits being
«amazed» by those men who, while professing the Christian faith, live in
the name of hatred and iniquity. What is the cause of all this? Why do the
doctors of the Church –only moved by passions, that is, by the desire of
being publicly admired as orators capable of leading the masses and by
the will of vengeance toward those who disagree with them– teach how
to despise reason, to go against the intellect? Why is religion only credulity
and prejudice?
The same criticism is also present in other passages of the text. In one
of these passages Spinoza observes that «so many quite contradictory
beliefs are taught by different sects as articles of faith» (TTP, XIV) due to
the incapacity to discern in the Scriptures what is doctrine of faith and
what is simply an adaptation of the thought of the Prophets to the limited
comprehension of their people. Spinoza concludes:
However, I will not level the charge of impiety against those
sectaries simply because they adapt the words of Scripture to
their own beliefs. Just as Scripture was once adapted to the
understanding of the people of that time, in the same way
anyone may now adapt it to his own beliefs if he feels that
this will enable him to obey God with heartier will in those
matters that pertain to justice and charity. My accusation
against them is this, that they refuse to grant this same freedom
to others. All those who do not share their opinions, however
righteous and truly virtuous the dissenters may be, they
persecute as God’s enemies, while those who follow their
lead, however dissolute they may be, they cherish as God’s
elect. Surely nothing more damnable than this, and more fraught
with danger to the state, can be devised. (TTP, XIV).
Therefore, doctors of the church and interpreters of the Scriptures
instead of performing their function of leaders of their people, working
for the growth of each individual’s rationality and insight, make their
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passions overflow, with destructive and self-destructive consequences.
Given this distressing scenario, who can be considered trustworthy? What
ideal should be followed? At the end of the Preface, Spinoza reveals that
the interlocutors of his Tractatus, his ideal readers, are not those men
«who are victims of the same emotional attitudes» (TTP, Preface) of the
preachers. He invokes a philosopher-reader (lector philosophus). Now,
given the «militant» aim of the work to influence the political life of the
Netherlands and to go against its growing fanaticism, the intention of the
text cannot be simply to strengthen of the capacity for rationality of a few
philosophers. I believe that the «philosopher reader» of Spinoza should
be identified with the new teacher of the multitudo. Spinoza’s ideal reader
is the person who by reading his work will improve not only her life, but
also that of other people. The ‘philosopher readers’ of Spinoza are not
supposed to become slavish peddlers of the Tractatus: repeating what
the teacher says is not crucial (Spinoza observes how the doctors of the
Church who have become bad teachers have transformed the temple
into a theater where they behave like leading actors); only the conduct,
the lifestyle is essential. Thus, those who learn how to live according to
charity and justice by reading the correct interpretation of the Scriptures
in the Tractatus witness with their own deeds (this is a motif in Spinoza)
the goodness and effectiveness of the abstract teaching.
Also in the Ethics Spinoza criticizes the pedagogic ideology of his time.
Calvinism, as Simon Schama has reminded us in his work on the Netherlands
of the Golden Age, demanded extreme rigor in education and denied any
kind of indulgence for the fragility of children and human weakness in general.
Spinoza refers explicitly to the Calvinist rigorists when he writes the famous
words of the Preface to the third book of the Ethics:
Again, they assign the cause of human weakness and frailty
not to the power of  Nature in general, but to some defect in
human nature, which they therefore bemoan, ridicule, despise,
or, as is most frequently the case, abuse. […] (Eth., III, praef.).
Spinoza’s criticism of those who judge human weakness mercilessly
and with no attempt  to empathize, perfectly matches another trait typical
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of bad educators. What Spinoza indicates as bad educators are those
who value the sad passions and look with suspicion at the joyful passions;
they see these manifestations of joy as the sign of insufficient contrition
for their meager human nature and of a depraved inclination. Spinoza
comments:
The principle that guides me and shapes my attitude to life is
this: no deity, nor anyone else but the envious, takes pleasure
in my weakness and my misfortune, nor does he take to be a
virtue our tears, sobs, fearfulness, and other such things that
are a mark of a weak spirit. On the contrary, the more we are
affected with pleasure, the more we pass to state of greater
perfection; that is, the more we necessarily participate in the
divine nature. (Eth., IV, 45 sch.).
In the Ethics we find the same critical reflections of the TTP against
those who only know how to deprecate vice and cannot teach virtue;
these people do not lead others with the power of reason but only with
the fear of punishment (Eth, IV, 63 sch.); they infect with their own misery
those who should be helped by them, extending to others their own slavery
made of sad passions. On the contrary, someone «who desires to help
others by word or deed to enjoy the highest good along with him» will
«dwell on human virtue, or power, and the means to perfect it» (Eth, IV,
app. 25) instead of speaking all the time of human vices and weaknesses.
Spinoza’s charge against the bad teachers of his time is expressed
beautifully in one formula, a sort of synthesis of his paideutic criticism:
non firmare sed frangere (Eth, IV, 13 cap):4  this formula –that in the
title of the present essay we have overturned in order to come up with a
sort of anthropagogic motto of Spinozism– constitutes Spinoza’s
condemnation of bad education. According to Spinoza, bad teachers
break the soul of the young instead of strengthening it, instead of marking
4 G, II, 269: At qui contra homines carpere, et vitia potiùs exprobare, quàm virtutes
docere, et hominum animos non firmare sed frangere norunt, ii et sibi, et reliquis molesti
sunt; […].
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their bodies and minds with formative traces; they influence the students
in a violent and absurd way because they do not respect their form and in
so doing they end up de-forming them. Spinoza tells us that the ultimate
and overarching goal of every formative praxis cannot be the correction
of vice. Education must aim instead at the full explication of human
potency5.  In the Scholium to proposition 10 of the fifth part of the Ethics
Spinoza engages the bad teachers in a final battle:
It is therefore certain that those who raise the loudest outcry
about the abuse of honor and about worldly vanity are most
eager for honor. Nor is this trait confined to the ambitious: it is
shared by all who meet with adverse fortune and are weak in
spirit. For the miser, too, who is in poverty, does not cease to
talk of the abuse of money and the vices of the rich, with the
result that he merely torments himself and makes it clear that
he resents not only his own poverty but also the wealth of others.
So, too, those who have been ill received by a sweetheart are
obsessed by thoughts of the fickleness and deceitfulness of
women and the other faults commonly attributed to them, but
immediately forget about all this as soon as they again find
favor with their sweetheart. (Eth, V, 10 sch.).
This long passage is crucial to Spinoza’s criticism of the pedagogical
practices of this time. The context of this psychologically insightful passage
is Spinoza’s attempt to formulate some general rules for making the order
of the affections of the body match with that of the intellect. Spinoza
suggests that we organize our thoughts and our images starting from the
good that can be found in everything, so that we can be moved by a
joyful affect. On the contrary, the judgments and actions of castigators
are only motivated by sad affects.
5 We find on this point one of the many congruities between Spinoza and Nietzsche,
where also for the German philosopher formation should be understood as the full explication
of the nature of the individual, of her nucleus beyond correction, as he explains in the third
of the untimely meditations, Schopenhauer as educator. For an analysis of the congruities
between Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s paideutic projects, see Zaltieri 2013.
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It might seem surprising at first that Spinoza stigmatizes those who
deprecate the three «false goods» on which Spinoza himself has reflected
at the outset of the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (On the
Improvement of the Understanding): glory, wealth, and sex. According
to the communis institutum vitae, these three goods tend to become
the ultimate end of human life. Thus, Spinoza’s journey of conversion
toward the novum institutum will also begin with a deep criticism of a
life totally devoted to the accumulation of glory, money, and sexual
pleasure. A man can turn toward «true and sharable goods» only by
recognizing the vanity and futility of those ends. Given that the polemical
target is the same, what is the difference between Spinoza and the bad
teachers he attacks?
The difference lies in what we could call the different ‘affective attitude’
of the bad  teachers compared to the philosopher. The affective attitude
of the moralists is labeled with precision in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy
of Morals: ressentiment. Ressentiment is the reactive production of
values based on the deprecation of other people’s actions caused by the
envy and weakness we experience when we do not know how to emulate
them6.  However, if envy is for the most part conscious, resentment is on
the contrary much more devious; it is often accompanied by a false
conscience. The moralist, wounded by someone else’s glory for which
he is incapable of experiencing any joy; by someone else’s wealth from
which he is excluded; by the sexual pleasure that he finds repugnant in
other people’s existence because his own life does not have any; the
moralist, I was saying, builds a set of values based on his sad passions,
which tend to annihilate the power of  body and mind.
But we do not find any trace of this in the intense and moving pages
of On the Improvement of the Understanding. Spinoza is neither
motivated by the envy for other people’s lives lived under the communis
institutum, nor by deprecations and moralistic judgments of them; in his
incredible analyses of the ill-fated dependence that some people develop
6 Nietzsche 1887.
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for the above mentioned three common goods, Spinoza always uses the
first person plural, «we». Thus, Spinoza does not hide his own weakness;
he does not neglect the disorientation that catches him when confronted
with the fact that seeking glory and public acknowledgment often implies
lying to many people in order to please them; he does not overlook that
we become slaves of the pleasures we seek. Spinoza does not want to
portray himself as a solitary ascetic and tower over the masses, victims
of futile and idle things; rather, he is led to his ethical transformation by his
own suffering; by the anxiety that assails him as if he were «terminally ill».
In short, what moves him is not the condemnation of other people. This
affective attitude, characterized by a love of freedom, by the refusal of
dependence, «with the joy that arises from the true knowledge» (Eth, V,
10 sch), is the only ethical attitude capable of leading to a genuine Bildung.
It is not simply one element among many others in our character; rather,
it is, as I have suggested, a fundamental attitude or ‘habit,’ and most
importantly it requires askesis, self-discipline, and the capacity to govern
one’s conatus intelligendi towards a constant knowledge of one’s self
and one’s affects. It is at once a never-ending journey and an exercise in
self-formation (Eth, V, 15)7.
3.  A Spinozistic Pedagogy?
The manifold criticism that Spinoza moves to the paideutic apparatus
of his time is not  limited to the complex relationship between his philosophy
and his education. Spinoza is not only a master of suspicion of the formation
that de-forms. His main concern is to indicate a path of perfection for the
human being.
7 Since the knowledge of one’s self and of one’s affects is achieved for Spinoza not
through a solipsistic gesture, such as that of Descartes’ Cogito, but only through the effects
of the encounters with others on one’s self, I agree with Juliana Merçon when she speaks
of an «ética pensada como um aprendizado afetivo» and «o aprendizado afetivo como uma
arte do encontro: um aprender sobre o que diminui nossas forças ou nos potencializa».
(Merçon, 2009, 22).
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We should pause a minute on the fact that for Spinoza it is in a certain
sense meaningless to talk of a being as perfect or imperfect because
every being, if understood as a finite mode of the infinite divine power, is
just as it is supposed to be. In this sense, a being is never lacking.
However, continues Spinoza, the humana imbecillitas –expression that
Spinoza takes from Seneca, namely the inborn weakness of our mind
that prevents man from conceiving the order of all things– at the same
time is accompanied by the ‘force’ (the one is not without the other) of
being capable of conceiving a greater perfection of itself (TIE § 13). We
can conceive this ‘model’ of the human in Spinozist terms only as the
perfect expression of the singular nature of every body and every mind.
Thus, to every man a path to self- improvement is available; Spinoza
defines this path as a «transire ad maiorem perfectionem». (Eth, III,
11 sch). In this sense, every singularity can be thought as a ‘perfectible
perfection’.
So, Spinoza’s entire philosophical project can be legitimately
interpreted as a project for the enhancement of the human being. But
does this legitimize us to speak of a ‘Spinozistic pedagogy’? Spinoza
shows great attention to the topic of education, both to point out the
flaws of extant systems or to point toward better alternatives. For example,
Spinoza observes that again, «since among particular things we know of
nothing more excellent than a man who is guided by reason, nowhere can
each individual display the extent of his skill and genius more than in so
educating men that they come at last to live under the sway of their own
reason» (Eth, IV, app. 9).
When considering the necessity of a journey toward «the achievement
of the highest human perfection» (TIE, §16), Spinoza observes that this
journey cannot be solipsistic. Other people must be involved in this
process. Sometimes he even attempts to trace the guidelines for this
enterprise and ties them to the necessity of building a desirable society, of
implementing the available medical and mechanical sciences, and of putting
technology more and more at the service of human beings. In this context,
Spinoza observes that «attention must be paid to moral philosophy and
likewise the theory of education of children» (TIE, § 15).
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François Zourabichvili, one of the most insightful and original
interpreters of Spinoza, concludes from the above statement that, if
Spinoza had not died so young, his next step in philosophy after the
Tractatus would have probably been the elaboration of a pedagogical
model.8 Zourabichvili even proposes the major lines of a possible
Spinozistic pedagogy relying on the following four principles: 1) cultivating
the attitudes of the body and those of the mind in the same way; 2)
stimulating hope more than fear by using immanent rewards; 3) adjusting
to the capacity for comprehension of the student by using the Spinozistic
concept of prophetism, that is, by moving from the nucleus present in all
religions (love for the other, justice, charity) to the mathematics, which
have tremendously fruitful properties for the formation of the mind; 4)
always keeping in mind the connection between affects and reason. My
tenet is that although these four guidelines can be hardly disputed in their
generality it is problematic to agree with Zourabichvili on the idea of a
‘Spinozistic pedagogy’. The problem here is the very character and
foundations of pedagogy as a science of formation. Western science is
born undoubtedly with a well-defined vocation, which we could describe
as nomomorphic: its aim is the construction of laws; science is where a
universal logos is found; it has always been since Aristotle the knowledge
of the secondary substance, the universal. Pedagogy understood as the
science of formation does not escape the law-based character of this
tradition. In this precise sense, Spinoza should instead be considered the
champion of a project of ‘anti-pedagogical’ formation. In fact, for Spinoza
it is impossible to find a pedagogical logos, a universal knowledge about
education, a correct enhancement strategy for the human that can be
invariably applied to every singular case. At the basis of this conviction is
Spinoza’s specific idea of form.9
As is well known, Spinoza, together with other Modern philosophers,
rejected the Aristotelian and Scholastic concept of ‘substantial form’ as
8 Zourabichvili 2002 II, 163.
9 Zourabichvili himself, in his monograph Spinoza. Une physique de la pensée, offers
a complete analysis of the idea of form. (Zourabichvili 2002 I).
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non-rigorous and unscientific. Universals in Platonic and Aristotelian sense
are only inadequate modes of thinking. Spinoza repeats over and over
again that only individual things have a cause and that universals are
uncaused and as a consequence cannot be found in individuals. For the
same reason, they constitute the innermost nature of things (KV, I, VI,
[7]). The universal concept of ‘man’ is for Spinoza a truncated and
confused notion derived from the incapacity of the mind to retain all the
defining characters of each particular singularity (Eth, II, 40, 1 sch).
Thus, Spinoza’s idea of ‘form’ should not be understood in the sense
of the ‘substantial form’ or universal. This notion occurs in the Theologico-
Political Treatise and in the Political Treatise, where forma imperii
(or facies or fabrica) means the structures of the state, and also in the
Ethics. But Spinoza deals with the problem of the form also when he is
dealing with different (but related) concepts, such as fabrica or facies,
which indicates what is essential for a being to express what it is in a
complete way, in accordance with the laws of nature that determine its
power.10 In the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, the
form of each being, completely inseparable from the being itself, is
presented as the balance between rest and motion. This physical and
biological reading of the idea of form, deeply rooted in the bodily nature
of the being, is presented with more details in the Ethics, where Spinoza
introduces the notion of conatus. Conatus is the affective power or
capacity of affecting others and being affected by them. With the conatus
the form acquires an energetic-relational meaning: it is a unique, singular,
degree of affective power that manifests itself in encounters; it is destined
to vary because it grows or decreases depending on the kinds of
encounters.
Spinoza points out that men share certain traits and practices that are
the expression of their own specific character. In this sense, the third
formulation of form in Ethics, «man is virtue», leads us to an aspect of
10 For a discussion in France of the plausibility in Spinoza of the idea of form applied
to the human being, see Moreau 1994, 27-35; in Suhamy 2003 the author analyses all the
available interpretations.
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form that can be considered as exclusively human. Virtue is conatus
–«to act, to live, to preserve one’s own being»– but guided by reason
(Eth IV, 24). Reason is here not a principle superior to conatus, but a
part of it, a dimension of it. It has certain special features: it is a power
seeking conveniences (through the common notions); it is anti-
idiosyncratic; it allows man to have access to ideas that are not restrained
by the limits of his individual imagination; it is the ‘ethical’ dimension of
thought which always takes into account the web relationships in which
each one of us is placed; it allows us to make our deeds appropriate and
not subject to the received drives of passion.
This inevitable schematic digression should however be helpful to aid
us in understanding that the notion of form, always rooted in the singularity
of a body both as a specific relationship of rest and motion and of conatus
and virtue (or as a unique expression of affective power, guided by reason,
manifesting only in relations, in actual encounters) is not suited to become
the subject matter of a pedagogical science aiming at the universal.
4.  Caute! Against Pedagogical Stereotypes
Besides appreciating Spinoza’s notion of form, it is important to avoid
the pedagogical stereotypes that are incompatible with Spinoza’s genuine
message. In this section I consider two recurrent stereotypes of the
Spinozistic vulgata.
The first recurrent stereotype is the image of Spinoza as the champion
of an antiauthoritarian pedagogy. This interpretation tends to have the
regrettable outcome of crystallizing some aspects of Spinoza’s thought.
In many passages, Spinoza criticizes the pedagogical strategies based on
the exercise of authority and power. For instance, he remarks that:
doubtless more frequent and more bitter quarrels are wont to
arise between parents and children than between masters and
slaves. Yet it is not to the advantage of household management
to change paternal right into the right of ownership and to
treat children as if they were slaves. (TP, VI, §4).
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Spinoza is not concerned here specifically with authority; more
broadly, in his view it is always necessary to criticize the goals of the
pedagogical action: is education’s goal to develop docile bodies, ready
to serve other people’s aims (slaves) or to promote the growth of
autonomous individuals? The problem of treating «children as if they were
slaves» is not only a problem of authoritarian systems of education. Rather,
it is a problem any time sons and students are not educated for the
development of their own autonomy and utility, and are kept subject to
someone else’s utility. We find a confirmation of this interpretation in the
TTP:
Now perhaps it will be thought that in this way we are turning
subjects into slaves, the slave being one who acts under orders
and the free man one who does as he pleases. But this is not
completely true, for the real slave is one who lives under
pleasure’s sway and can neither see nor do what is for his
own good, and only he is free who lives whole-heartedly under
the sole guidance of reason. Action under orders –that is,
obedience– is indeed to some extent an infringement of
freedom, but it does not automatically make a man a slave;
the reason for the action must enter into account. If the purpose
of the action is not to the advantage of the doer but of him
who commands, then the doer is a slave, and does not serve
his own interest. […] Similarly, although children are in duty
bound to obey all the commands of their parents, they are not
slaves; for the parents’ commands have as their chief aim the
good of the children. We therefore recognize a great difference
between a slave, a son, and a subject, who accordingly may
be defined as follows. A slave is one who has to obey his
master’s commands which look only to the interests of him
who commands; a son is one who by his father’s command
does what is to his own good; a subject is one who, by
command of the sovereign power, acts for the common good,
and therefore for his own good also. (TTP, XVI).
We can also find further confirmation of this reading in the analysis of
the formative action of Moses. In the TTP, Moses is clearly presented
not only as a prophet and political leader, but also as a teacher, or as the
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ethical and moral guide of his people. Spinoza recounts that the Jewish
people after the Egyptian captivity are in a condition of rational impotence
and lack the capacity for self-government due to the prolonged slavery.
They are almost reduced to the condition of infants. Moses guides his
people with a command that he has obtained due to his proven virtue,
and enforces it to the fullest extent of the law. Spinoza adds to this: «But
in so doing he made every effort to see that the people should do their
duty willingly rather than through fear» (TTP, V). Moses was a real teacher
because his authority was based on the capacity to make the desire of his
people adhere to the Law that they took as useful and just. He exercised
his authority as a means to bring his people to a condition of greater
maturity, self-government, and autonomy.11
The second recurrent stereotype is Spinoza’s alleged condemnation
of the ‘sad passions’. It is important to analyze this topic in all its complex
nature instead of applying to it a ready-made interpretation.
There is no doubt that the ethical trajectory of Spinoza’s work is
ideally oriented to the liberation of the human being from the subjection
to his sad passions. In fact, the sad passions weaken the conatus. At the
same time, however, it is extremely important to point out that Spinoza is
well aware of the paideutic and communitarian value that the sad passions
have. We have here something like an ‘affective strategy’12 that every
educational path must follow. Not even the wise man will ever be able to
eradicate his passions from his soul completely, including the sad ones,
and the majority of men will have to deal with them constantly. Thus, it
becomes necessary to use them in the best way possible, namely, to
11 As a confirmation of the idea that it is impossible to apply the same rule of action to
different cases, Spinoza finds useful to point out that the Mosaic model is at the antipodes
of the Dutch aspiration and would not work if applied to a situation different from that of
the Jewish people killed during the Egyptian captivity. (TTP, XVIII).
12 The concept of ‘stratégie du conatus’ is due to Laurent Bove, who has studied its
political aspects. This concept indicates the necessity, pointed out by Spinoza, to consider
the finitude of one’s own potency and to create the conditions for its implementation
through virtuous relations. (Bove 1996).
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exploit their practical force, in order to realize the perfection not only of
the wise but of anybody else in the human community. Spinoza says that
the path to perfection cannot be solitary and solipsistic; although different
for each mode, it can succeed only if it involves the greatest number of
men. Modes are forever in the hands of an infinity of intermodal relations
and even the encounters among modes liberated by the sad passions are
able to increase their power in a certain way.
Let us focus now on Spinoza’s strategies to make the sad passions
less destructive, to contain and shape the weakening produced by them.
First, the preliminary work to do is an exercise of demystification, as it is
expressed in the clear and blunt propositions of the third book of the
Ethics, where the traditional valorization of the sad passions is disputed.
Spinoza tells us that fear and hope (an affect of joy but unstable because
it is based on an imaginary projection on the future) are not good in
themselves because the former feeds the sense of impotence and the
latter is always accompanied by fear; commiseration is detrimental and
useless if it is not conducive to help the one who is commiserated in a
concrete way; humility is not a virtue if it is a growth of power because
humility is born out of the recognition of one’s weaknesses and then inhibits
our action; repentance should not be exalted because it is simply the
repetition of the weakness of the mode, who is crushed first by evil cupidity
and then by the sadness of the repentance; self-contempt has the same
overwhelming effect as the highest pride, and neither one nor the other
stands for a real self-knowledge, and the ignorance that they manifest is
only the sign of impotence…  All these reflections play a critical function
in the educational path of Spinoza; we can appreciate in fact that it is
impossible to bring perfection to anybody when an educational path is
based on a system of value aiming at weakening body and mind. However,
we still have to wonder whether there is some advantage in the sad
passions, given the fact that a humanity where there is no trace of sad
passions resembles a utopia in which Spinoza does not believe. Therefore,
Spinoza suggests a possible path to perfection both for the wise and for
those whose nature is not suited for wisdom. Here’s what he says regarding
some of the sad passions that he has just stigmatized:
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As men seldom live according to the dictates of reason, these
two emotions, humility and repentance, and also hope and
fear, bring more advantage than harm; and thus, if sin we
must, it is better to sin in their direction. For if men of weak
spirit should all equally be subject to pride, and should be
ashamed of nothing and afraid of nothing, by what bonds could
they be held together and bound? The mob is fearsome, if it
does not fear. So it is not surprising that the prophets, who
had regard for the good of the whole community, and not of
the few, have been so zealous in commending humility,
repentance, and reverence. And in fact those who are subject
to these emotions [hisce affectibus sunt obnoxii] can be far
more readily induced than others to live by the guidance of
reason in the end, that is, to become free men and enjoy the
life of the blessed. (Eth, IV, 54 sch.).
Spinoza makes us understand what a strategic use of the sad passions
might look like. These affects can be used for the binding power that they
manifest, for the coercive strength that leads individuals –mainly if they
show weakness of heart, impotency, infantilism– to feel part of the same
community. Shame, for instance, as Lévinas has clearly shown,13 implies
a twofold movement of the subject: on the one hand, the subject acts as
the judge of himself (the movement of subjectivation in which we are the
subject of a judgment on ourselves) and, on the other hand, the subject is
captured in a process of de-subjectivization (where we are the object of
shame). This split implies, as Spinoza teaches us, the contribution of the
imagination to make the other somewhat present, for without an other
shame would not be possible. Thus, shame is a sad passion, but it is also
capable of forcing the individual to overcome the tight borders of solipsism
and impotence. «By what bonds could they [men of weak spirit] be held
together and bound?» then if not by sad passions such as shame or
fear or hope?
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373-392, reprinted in a volume by J. Rolland, Fata Morgana, Montpellier.
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It is important to clarify that the power that sad passions have to
conjoin people should not be confused with the fact that all human beings
share a rational condition, nor in the «being-in-common» that is given in
the intellect, in the amor dei intellectualis. It is rather a conjunction that
we would define as ‘projective’, imaginative: this projective conjunction
is at work where the dividing force of the sad passions is manifested:
shame separates myself from the other that I imagine judging me, and in
this way leads to a certain bond; shame evokes the other who judges me
imaginatively, and in this way a bond is formed, even in the absence of
‘convergence’ or ‘convenience’. It is clear that this projective push that
creates mutual bonds among men happens according to a sort of weaving
of our imagination, which, although limited and incomplete, connects the
multiplicity of the modes, preventing in this way any monadic solipsism,
and moving the mind, even though still in the inadequate form of
imagination, toward the ontological connection of the modes in the
Substance and with the Substance. Spinoza does not deprecate or deride
the sad passions; instead he tries to comprehend them rationally (non
ridere, non lugere, nesque detestari, sed intelligere) and manages to
single out their paideutic aspects. These passions can be the occasion for
leading men to abandon the solipsism that weakens their mind and body;
it pushes them –even though only through projection, imaginatively– to
constitute bonds in the community, the very same community that an
effective educational path requires and at once contributes to build. A
paideia does not have to shelter itself from the sad passions, or simply
criticize them a priori, but must transform them into a strength and commit
itself to temper them. However, since these passions always have the
capacity to weaken and isolate, singular modes should be prevented from
exhausting their powers in these sad passions. For the same reason, it is
impossible to elaborate an ethics based on them, since they would produce




The joyful passions play a positive function in the path conducive to
perfection. The worst case of a system of monoaffectivity14 is that of a
sad affect: think about the generalized aversion of the misanthrope for
every human being, the sadness that pervades every gesture of the
depressed. Even the monoaffectivity of a joyful passion can be dangerous.
This is shown in the first pages of On the Improvement of the
Understanding where Spinoza analyses the exclusive love for a finite
and transient object: pleasure (lust), wealth (greed), honor (glory). The
danger of the institutum vitae based on one of these passions lies in the
fixation of the passion on only one object. In fact, the passions connected
to our seeking pleasure in a moderate way, to a moderate use of resources,
to the legitimate need of interlocutors who agree with us and appreciate
us should not be condemned: Spinoza is not an ascetic.15 What is
dangerous according to Spinoza, what constitutes a threat for a stable
happiness and leads to existential failure, is the monoidetic system that
the lustful, the greedy, or the glory-thirsty builds as his institutum vitae.
Thus, the obsession that we find sometimes in a joyful passion, as for
example the love for another finite mode when this mode monopolizes
the entirety of our affective power, can be as dangerous for a real education
as a sad affection: in both cases we are in a condition of slavery, of
dependence.
To conclude, we trivialize Spinoza’s philosophy when we reduce it to
a criticism of the sad passions and to an exaltation of the joyful ones. If
educating means having always to do with a multitude of passions, with
‘pathic’ modifications, acting in a formative way implies an affective strategy
that must always take into account the singularity of the paideutic encounter.
Only the active affects (actions) increase the power of the individual;
however, while we receive the sad and joyful passions with our existence,
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14 Matheron 1969 speaks of a monoïdéisme catastrophique to describe the situation of
an individual subject to a single strong affect that becomes the filter of every experience.
15 For an analysis of sexuality in Spinoza according to which the moderation of lust
should not lead to chastity, see Matheron, A. (1986). «Spinoza et la sexualité», in
Anthropologie et politique au XVIIe siècle, Vrin, Paris, 209-230.
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the active affects are, on the contrary, only a slow and difficult achievement;
they are the goal of that ‘transformation’ of the individual that should
accompany every formation worthy of this name. The ethical end that
Spinoza ideally indicates to the wise is the liberation from the dominion of
the sad passions, which decrease the conatus and keep us away from
achieving the domain of reason. However, at the same time, Spinoza
invites us to value the political and educational meaning that some of the
sad passions inherently bring.
5. Moving out of Childhood: For a Bildung without
Pedagogy
Zourabichvili suggests that we read Spinoza as a philosopher fighting
to liberate human beings from two poisonous illusions: that of the infans
adultus and that of the God-King. Fighting these illusions, human beings
can aspire to overcome childhood as an age of immaturity and
dependence. Abandoning the illusion of the infans adultus, the individual
learns how to read childhood not as a lacking state (i.e. a state lacking
adulthood), but in its specific ‘perfection’ and, at the same time, how to
follow the right path in order to get to a complete realization of his power
in adulthood. But also the community, by freeing itself from the illusion of
the God-King, overcomes the superstition of a God understood as a
judge and lord and of sovereignty conceived as an absolute. In this way,
the members of a community have finally access to a full and realized
citizenship. ‘Individuals and societies overcoming childhood’: this could
be a good definition of the overarching finality of Spinoza’s work.
Overcoming childhood as a state of immaturity is the goal where both the
philosophical-ethical and the political projects of Spinoza meet: the former
exemplified by the new ethos of On the Improvement of the
Understanding and of the Ethics, the latter by the project of a full
sovereignty of the multitudo in the Theological-Political Treatise and
the Political Treatise. It is hard then not to agree with Zourabichvili on
the image of Spinoza as a liberator. If we agree with Nietzsche when he
says in Schopenhauer as Educator that «your educators can be only
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your liberators»,16 then the definition of ‘educator’ or ‘teacher’ applies
perfectly to Spinoza.
However, as I have tried to show, Spinoza remains a teacher without
a scientific pedagogy. In fact, the broad and liberal educational path
indicated by his philosophy is not suited to be restrained within a
pedagogic logos or within a scientifically rigorous method. In this sense,
Bildung is perhaps the best term to describe the formative path suggested
by Spinoza, at least if we listen to what Goethe says about the meaning of
Bildung. Goethe explains that German has two words to describe the
development of a living being: Gestalt and Bildung. The former means
the fixity and completeness of the form achieved, the latter has in itself the
idea of a continuous transformation of the living being, the flux of its ongoing
change.17
But also the concept of ars educandi is well-suited to convey
the idea of a formative activity that needs to be always tailored
on the individual, the art of leaving educational traces on the
other modes and at the same time of being marked by them,18
constantly dealing with the elaboration of a strategy (that of
the implementation of the conatus) based on moves for which
a creative rationality, and not simply the mere obedience to
ready-made rules, is necessary.
I now introduce the implications for a theory of Bildung that,
according to my interpretation, follows from Spinoza’s text.
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16 Nietzsche 1876, §2.
17 «The Germans have a word for the complex of existence presented by a physical
organism: Gestalt. With this expression they exclude what is changeable and assume that an
interrelated whole is identified, defined, and fixed in character. But if we look at all these
Gestalten, especially the organic ones, we will discover that nothing in them is permanent,
nothing is at rest or defined – everything is in a flux of continual motion. This is why
German frequently and fittingly makes use of the word Bildung to describe the end product
and what is in process of production as well». (Goethe on Science. An Anthology of Goethe’s
Scientific Writings, 1996, Selected and introduced by Jeremy Naydler, with a foreword by
Henri Bortoft, Edinburgh UK: Floris.)
18 Spinoza’s concept of trace (vestigium) is analyzed brilliantly in Vinciguerra 2012.
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5.1. The Individual Body
Since Deleuze,19 the topic, dear to Spinoza, of what a body can do
has become one of the most debated problems in the scholarship. Spinoza,
going decidedly against the Platonic-Christian idea of the body as the
source of constant trouble and interference for our reason, teaches that
the power of the body, far from being an obstacle for the power of the
mind, makes it grow (Eth II, 13 sch.). The constant reference to the
body in the Ethics makes it impossible to dephysicalize the Bildung
understood as the perfection of the mode. The complex nature of a Bildung
can never amount to a mere practice of thought, to a purely mental
inference. We can understand the deep unity between mind and body if
we pause on what we could call the ‘anomalous monism’ about the mind-
body relation that Spinoza presents in the Ethics.20 Spinoza’s position
can be classified as ‘monism’ because mind and body are not taken as
two different Substances; and his monism is ‘anomalous’ because it rejects
both the reduction of the mind to a product of the body, as a coarse
materialism would be inclined to think, and the reduction of the body to a
tool of the mind, as held for instance by a certain popularized Platonism.
Thus, his monism demands that we acknowledge the specific nature of
both modes, the mode of thought and that of the body.
Spinoza invites us to acknowledge that human judgments and
interpretations go first unconsciously through the body (or, more precisely,
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19 G. Deleuze 1990.
20 Reading Spinoza’s theory of the mind-body relation as an ‘anomalous monism’ does
not mean using this concept in the same way as Donald Davidson 1970. Davidson’s
anomalous monism is incompatible with Spinoza’s view because it implies an interaction
between physical and mental events, which is unconceivable for Spinoza; moreover, the
anomaly of which Davidson speaks concerns the mental level where the causal relations do
not follow the laws of physics and are in this sense ‘anomalous’. The anomaly I am talking
about refers instead to Spinoza’s subversive idea of the mind-body relation if seen in light
of the Western tradition. Spinoza’s stance does not fit any of the traditional views: it is
neither (Platonic) dualism nor materialism. In this sense, Spinoza’s thought induces us to
elaborate a physics of the bodies in connection with a physics of thought, both understood
as different expressions of one and the same nature. And this idea is a philosophical
anomaly. On this see Zaltieri 2012.
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through the bodily reactions) and from there to the traces that the affects,
stimulated by the encounters with the other modes, have disseminated on
it. We have to also remember that the work of imagination proceeds
from the affections of the body (Eth, II, 18). In relation to this, the famous
example of the soldier (miles) and the farmer (rusticus) who, looking at
the horse tracks on the sand, have different thoughts, in consequence of
their different practices of the body: the miles will think about the war;
the rusticus will think about plowing a field (Eth, II, 18, sch). It remains
true that Spinoza is speaking of the connections internal to imagination,
not of those of reason or intellect; nevertheless, imagination is also the
expression of the power of the mind. Although imagination is the cause of
inadequate knowledge, it accompanies us throughout our entire life.
The importance of the body for the implementation of the mind is
certainly an unusual reading in the context of our tradition, which could
be well defined as ‘somatophobic’.21 This reading turns Spinoza into a
forerunner of the rehabilitation of the body as the pivotal point of human
reason that in the last century has had some of the most insightful supporters
in the fathers of philosophical anthropology and ethno-anthropological
science.
In order to appreciate Spinoza’s originality it might be helpful to
conduct a brief survey of Plessner’s and Gehlen’s philosophical
anthropology and Leroi-Gourhan’s paleontology. Helmuth Plessner,
already in his first work Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch22,
identifies the specificity of the human being in the special relation he has
to his body: a man is a body, but at the same time he has a body, that is,
he lives at a distance from it, he can objectify it as a tool and experience
its limits and also its ‘unrelatedness’ to consciousness, its impossibility to
be subject to a full control. It is in this reaction to the body that the human
being experiences his own ‘eccentric’ nature: mediation, not immediacy,
is the mark of his life.
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Arnold Gehlen, in his major work Der Mensch. Seine Natur und
Seine Stellung in der Welt (1940), individuates the originality of the
human being in the special biological features of his corporeity; if, on the
one hand, they make him a lacking organism, on the other hand, they
make him capable, due to the plasticity of his body, of using his primitivisms
and his lack of specialized functions positively. In the space created by
the mechanism of exoneration (Entlastung), technical mediation and habit
turn certain bodily responses into mechanisms, freeing in this way energies
for higher functions.
According to the French ethnologist and archeologist Leroi-Gourhan,
the tool for the hand and the language for the face emerge in the prehistory
of man as the two poles of the same apparatus.23 Language and writing
are then the main instruments for the construction of rationality. They are
born together. Crucial for this development is the achievement of the
erect posture, which frees the hand from ambulation and the phonetic
apparatus from the function of seeking food. Thus, it is in the specificity
of the human body that we find the origin of man’s rationality and cultural
history.
It is necessary to clarify, however, that Spinoza’s position is
unequivocally original if compared to the fathers of XXth century
philosophical anthropology. In fact, when Plessner, Gehlen, and Leroi-
Gourhan reflect on the body, they speak of the body of the species. On
the contrary, Spinoza’s radical alternative consists in the fact that he focuses
on the conformation and power of the single body as the elements
constituting individuality. For Spinoza, the mind is the individual idea of
an individual body. When he speaks of a body that «contains more reality»
(Eth, II, 13 sch), he wants to say that for a body to contain more reality
means «to act or be acted upon simultaneously in many ways» (Eth, II,
13 sch), namely, having more power means having more reality which in
turn means it can produce more effects. (Eth, II, 13 sch). The greater the




the power of the mind, also unique. In this sense, the Spinozistic conception
of the body is different from Nietzsche’s, who is the inspiration behind
Gehlen’s and Plessner’s reflection. Nietzsche is aware that the features
of each physical constitution cannot be reduced to a general notion of the
body, common to all men. This awareness is extremely explicit when
Nietzsche considers his own physiology, in particular the need that his
health and thinking have for the daily attention to food, landscape,
temperature, climate, and humidity, all elements that can strengthen or
weaken both body and thought. However, Nietzsche’s special approach
to the problem of the body consists in the construction of some bodily
‘types’ corresponding to different expressions of thought. In this way, the
artist, the ascetic, the priest, all correspond to different bodies and to
different systems of values. Their morals and thought are in a sense the
metabolism of their bodily type.
The topic of the singularity of the body, indistinguishable from the
individual expression of the mind, is then the original trait of Spinoza’s
reflection on the body. Every Bildung should take into account the special
nature of that individual body and value its capacities and the specific and
unique modalities of expression of its nature. Only in this way will the
specific features of a mind develop accordingly. It is necessary to
remember that for Spinoza the power of the body is not a mere liberation
of force, but the capacity to produce many effects, organizing different
competencies, both active and passive, capable of acting but also of
being acted upon.
5.2. The Work on Memory
Freud claims that educating, governing, and analyzing are «impossible»
professions (Unmöglichen Berufe).24 The reason would be that their
unsatisfactory outcome is already known in advance. He believes that it
is not possible to reach the full and definitive realization of their
NON FRANGERE SED FIRMARE: SPINOZA...
24 Freud 1937.
186 D100
corresponding ends: perfectly realized individuality, harmonious and just
polish, psychical balance. What we find interesting in this triad is that all
the three practices require (in education, in politics, and analysis) a
transformation of the subject and of his memory. Education must transform
childhood memory, which tends to link every stimulus to its immediate
satisfaction believing that this connection is the only satisfactory one, in
the memory of an adult, capable of links that transcend the immediate
satisfaction and realize what is truly useful. The art of the good government
should correct through good laws, good administration, and good
examples, the mnestic connections underpinning collective and private
habits, based on fear, greed, enslavement of the soul. It should lay the
foundation for a new memory, based on collective virtuous habits. Finally,
this psychotherapy is to some extent also an exercise in the ‘correction’
of memory; its scope is not simply to modify the state of affairs and the
events of a life, but also to change the evaluation of those events encoded
in the memory and to eliminate the mnestic fixation of the trauma.
Memory plays a critical role for Spinoza in the formation of the
individual modes. In order to understand how, it is important, first, to
comprehend how the changes in the mnestic connections affect the pathic
transitions that are so fundamental in Spinozist Bildung. Spinoza clearly
shows that every change of a mode, both its bodily and mental expression,
has to do with a mnestic change.25 In On the Improvement, Spinoza
reflects on the particular nature of memory; according to his analysis,
memory is incremented when it follows a ‘logical’ order, or the order of
the intellect, which also relies on bodily traces. In fact, we remember
better a series of sentences logically connected, for instance a narration,
than a disconnected group of words. (TIE, 81). Spinoza adds to this that
our memory benefits from an unrepeatable encounter in its uniqueness
(the first love comedy that we have read), while when many analogous
memories occupy the mind (several other love comedies), then we will
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get confused and our memory will not be as lucid (TIE, [82]). However,
memory does not coincide with intellect, given that logical order is not
absolutely essential to it. « What, then, is memory?» – wonders Spinoza.
He provides the following answer: «It is nothing but the sensation of
impressions in the brain together with the thought of the determinate
duration of the sensation». (TIE, [83])  Thus, memory is a connection, an
order between something physical impressed from the outside and the
thought of its duration, which turns that impression into something that
lasts. While it is true that the durable trace can be understood without the
work of the intellect, the reverse is not the case: it is not possible to think
all the concatenations of ideas without a capacity already in place to
retain the traces that the encounters with the modes impress upon each
singularity. Retaining the traces is the work of the body; Spinoza says this
explicitly: «Yet it is impossible that we should remember that we existed
before the body, since neither can there be any traces of this in the body
[…]». (Eth V, 23, sch.). Building associations and mnestic orders implies
several different practices: building traces in the encounters with the other
modes, comparing similar traces and developing criteria of resemblance
based on the same affectivity so that corresponding habits will be
formed… Memory is an achievement obtained through all these activities;
it is the slow constitution of the capacity to establish the duration and to
let it sediment. This constitutes a great part of our identity. This is why
every change of our identity, such as the change due to our Bildung, is
essentially a change in our memory and requires a modification of our
practices. In the relation between the modification of the mnestic
connections and the increment of the conatus essendi, a central role is
played by the Scholium of proposition 10 of the fifth part of the Ethics,
which we have already commented in relation to our criticism of the moral
judgments based on resentment. The first part of this long Scholium is
devoted to the process of transformation of our style of life toward a
more rational conduct capable of implementing our conatus intelligendi.
Spinoza moves from the idea that the mnestic connections that link the
affections of the body according to the order of the intellect are stronger,
less subject to sad passions if compared to the connections based on
vague and uncertain affects. Spinoza observes:
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Therefore the best course we can adopt, as long as we do not
have perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive a
right method of living, or fixed rules of life, and to commit
them to memory and continually apply them to particular
situations that are frequently encountered in life, so that our
casual thinking is thoroughly permeated by them and they are
always ready to hand. (Eth V, 10 sch.)
Building new habits on affects that are not in opposition to our conatus
is the only way to transform or re-form our memory. Zourabichvili observes
on this that changing the order of our associations is the same thing as
changing the institutum vitae.26 I would add that this is true because in
both cases it is necessary to change our practices, and modifying these
practices means modifying our subjectivity; in fact, as Spinoza stresses at
different points, only our actions can manifest what we are. We are what
we do; we are our own practices.
When I introduced Spinoza’s criticism of the bad masters who are
motivated by resentment I evoked the idea that the philosopher-educator
needs a ‘correct attitude’; we have now all the elements to appreciate in
what that attitude consists: it consists in a constant attention to the affective
modifications to which we are subject in the intermodal encounters, in
the adoption of the habits of life that limit the sad passions and in the
consequent enhancement of the mnestic connections capable of perfecting
our conatus essendi; as in a virtuous circle, we become then more and
more capable of conscious actions and less and less passive.
It is easy to find in Spinoza a ‘pragmatist’ motif: we know someone
only through his actions (TTP, V and XI). Spinoza loves to cite St. James
when he says that it is not the profession of faith that makes someone a
real believer but his actions (TTP, XIV). This point mirrors interestingly
the interpretation of form as effectuality: what a being is lies in its power
and in the effects that thence follow. If actions (based on the love for the
other person, charity, and justice) are necessary to identify the true believer,
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they are also fundamental to the truly good master. His attitude, then, will
have to be ‘alethurgic’, in the sense that Foucault explains in his last
course at the Collège de France: «alethurgy would be the production of
truth, the act by which truth is manifested».27
5.3. Bildung as a Search for Accomodatio
The formation of the human being, understood in the Spinozist sense
of a transition toward a greater perfection, implies also a search for the
conveniences, namely, the possible correspondences with the other modes
capable of implementing our power. In Heidegger’s terms, we are thrown
in a being-together since our birth. But it is difficult to find in Spinoza’s
thought a fracture, such as the one present in Heidegger’s work, between
an alleged inauthentic dimension of existence (the anonymous public
dimension of the ‘one’) and a mirroring authentic dimension of the Self to
which we can get to only by rejecting the ‘one’. We could say that in
Spinoza the Self, the constitution of a free and responsible individual, can
find the occasion of its full expression only in the public ‘one’ to which he
belongs and out of which he cannot get.28 Spinoza writes:
Hence it follows that man is necessarily always subject to
passive emotions, and that he follows the common order of
Nature, and obeys it, and accommodates himself to it as far
as the nature of things demands. (Eth, IV, 4 cor.).
The verb ‘to accommodate’ translates the Latin accomodare and
refers to the noun accomodatio, which is used by Spinoza in letter 6 to
Oldenburg in an exclusively physical sense. It stands for that process for
which the encounters of the modes, from the niter to the carbonate or the
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water of the experiments detailed in the letter, are combined together. In
this physical sense accomodatio is at the basis of essential processes
such as nutrition, breathing…, in great part mechanical and nonreflexive.
The accomodatio among human beings has further relational implications;
it becomes part of the ethical sphere where the human being consciously
seeks his convenient disposition; this requires us to abandon every
individualistic narcissism but also every anthropocentrism, in order to
recognize that our health, understood in a broad, both medical and
psycho-existential sense, depends on the goodness of our disposition to
comprehend that the world is not tailored around us and that the other
modes can also benefit from our weakening and destruction. The most
efficacious response to this situation is not in the immune closure to all
that is external to us, but rather in a more adequate and complete
knowledge of how the other can enhance or weaken us.
The problem is then how to act in order to realize an accommodatio
understood as the correct disposition of our gestures, our practices, our
habits of life, in relation to the infinite number of beings that we encounter
every day. Besides its ethical and political implications, as Zourabichvili
has pointed out,29 accomodatio is a very important pedagogical subject,
capable of drawing the pedagogical implications of Spinoza’s motto
Caute. The knowledge of the other modes that we encounter is the first
fundamental step for our conservation and enhancement: this is how every
accomodatio must proceed. The ‘Know Thyself’ of the Socratic-Platonic
tradition loses its meaning in light of the essential idea of accommodatio.
Spinoza’s framework is better expressed by a different motto: ‘Know
the one you are going to encounter’, in order to try to find the possible
convergences, conveniences, that can improve both your Self and the
other. Moreover, the knowledge of the effects that every encounter
produces on the self is the only effective way to proceed in a path of self-
awareness. In this way we do not underplay the Delphic motto, but we
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clarify that the knowledge of one’s self grows together with the knowledge
of the other; this knowledge has a pragmatic rather than introspective
nature: it emerges only in the effects that are produced by the self in every
encounter with the other modes.
The search for accomodatio can be read as the junction between
education and politics; it shows their crossing destinies. There cannot be
education without the cautious and constant effort of accomodatio
regarding the entire ethos of formation. This is why education has a political
nature: because in its orienting the subject toward the other and in its
striving to find convergences and conveniences, the constitution of the
community is always at stake.
Dottore in ricerca, Cattedra di Filosofia Morale,
Università degli Studi di Bergamo
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